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The debate about the advantages and disadvantages of a single monetary policy in the 
euro area has been an important theme of political and academic discussion during the last 
decades.  
The single monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) may not fit all countries 
equally, so it is necessary to analyse its effects on specific countries separately. In this paper, 
we focus on Portugal, a small open economy, which is an interesting case study since it faced 
in the beginning of the 2010s high external imbalances, high public debt, low economic 
growth and an economic and financial adjustment programme. Therefore, we assess the 
impact of a tightening or accommodative monetary policy on Portugal, during the period 
2000:4-2015:4. We take into account the euro area monetary variables, the unconventional 
monetary policy instruments and changes in the transmission mechanism.   
In addition, monetary policy developments may trickle down differently across 
institutional sectors. Hence, we also study the impact of monetary policy on the relation 
between financial accounts of the institutional sectors. We consider the flows related to 
financial accounts for each of the five institutional sectors: general government, other 
monetary financial institutions (MFIs), households, non-financial corporations (NFCs) and 
the external sector. Consequently, we assess the impact of the monetary policy variables on 
these flows. In this way, a modified Taylor rule would not be appropriate to assess the impact 
of monetary policy due its sector encompassing approach. 
Our main results are as follows: i) monetary policy influenced all institutional sectors; 
ii) financial integration in the euro area had an effect on the funding for the Portuguese 
economy: long term public debt ratio, funding from the Portuguese central bank to the other 
MFIs, external funding, and new loans to households and NFCs; and iii) the period of the 
economic and financial adjustment programme (EFAP) impacted all institutional sectors: 
there was a reduction of long term-to-GDP ratio, external funding to the Portuguese other 
MFIs, and new loans to households.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section two presents a literature review. Section three 
addresses the methodological framework. Section four presents and discusses the results. 
Section five is the conclusion. 
 
2. Literature Review 
In order to place our paper in the literature, there are some studies about monetary policy 
focussing on several different issues. For instance, notably the Taylor rule as a benchmark to 
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assess the decisions of the central banks and the features of the European Monetary 
Union (EMU); the recent literature on the relationship between the financial crisis and the 
European sovereign debt crisis; the impact of non-conventional instruments of monetary 
policy on the economy; and financial markets and government bond yields.  
 
2.1. Period before the financial crisis 
Taylor (1993) explained the difference between discretion and policy rules in monetary 
policy. Under discretion, the setting of instruments is determined from scratch each period 
and without a contingency plan for the future. On the other hand, under a policy rule, there are 
feedback rules that respond to changes in unemployment and inflation. The policy rule does 
not have to be a mechanical formula.  The Taylor rule presented in (1), over the period 
1987-1992, defined that changes in the federal funds rate were determined by the evolution of 
the output gap and the deviation of inflation from the target:    
  =  + 0.5 + 0.5	 − 2 + 2 (1) 
where  is the federal funds rate,   is the deviation of real GDP from a target,  is the rate of 
inflation and 2 is a parameter close to the assumption of steady state growth for the US 
economy. Furthermore, the author took into account the transition from one policy rule to a 
new policy rule, such as a disinflation process and changing the inflation target rate from 5% 
to 2%. The author presented two case studies – German unification and the 1990 oil price 
shock – which illustrate how a policy rule cannot be applied mechanically. For example, the 
temporary increase of the deflator in 1990 during some months of the Iraqi war was higher 
than the fall of the real output, suggesting a misleading increase of the federal funds rates. 
Puri et al. (2011) studied the retail bank lending in Germany during the period 2006-2008 
based on loans applications and loans granted.1 The aim of the study was to assess the impact 
of the US financial crisis on the German retail bank lending. It is important to stress that some 
German banks invested substantially in the USA and consequently were affected by the US 
financial crisis. The authors also made a split between supply and demand side effects. There 
was an overall decrease in demand, which includes borrowers of affected and non-affected 
banks. Regarding the supply side, the results showed the US financial crisis contracted the 
supply of retail lending in Germany. In addition, the affected banks by the financial crisis 
rejected significantly more loans applications than non-affected banks, in particular small and 
liquidity constrained banks.  
                                                          




2.2. Period during and after the financial crisis 
Gaspar and Issing (2011) presented the role of the ECB for monetary policy in the euro 
area as well as its responsibilities defined by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU). Price stability over the medium term is the sole responsibility for the ECB’s 
monetary policy. However, the aim of price stability highlighted some tension between single 
monetary policy and national economic policies and financial stability, which were known 
during the financial and economic crisis 2007-2011. 
Nechio (2011) applied a version of the Taylor rule not only to the euro area as a whole, 
but also to each country. The target rate of the ECB seemed to be in line with the Taylor rule 
recommendation over the period 2001-2011. However, this rule recommended negative 
nominal interest rates in the case of the peripheral countries since the financial crisis. 
Nechio (2011) concluded that a single policy rate did not fit all member states because the 
core countries were recovering, while peripheral countries had large unemployment gaps.   
Lane (2012) assessed the European sovereign crisis and the impact of negative 
macroeconomic shocks. When the crisis occurred, the euro area presented a low degree of 
fiscal and banking union. The author identified risks of multiple equilibria when sovereign 
debt is high. The “bad equilibrium” leads to the risk of self-fulfilling speculative attacks, that 
is, an increase in perceptions of default risk induces investors to demand higher yields. 
Therefore, the rollover of public debt is more difficult and makes default more likely. On the 
other hand, the “good equilibrium” allows that the investors do not need to fear that a country 
is pushed into an involuntary default by inability to rollover public debt. Consequently, it was 
required policies to encourage the “good equilibrium”. A larger fund of the European Stability 
Mechanism as well as the ECB’s program to purchase sovereign bonds could attenuate such 
dire market conditions.2 
Schabert (2014) assessed how optimal monetary policy is constrained by credit market 
frictions and what is the role for central bank asset purchases. The author used a sticky price 
model where credit market is distorted when borrowing between private agents is constrained 
by available collateral. In this situation, optimal monetary policy ignores credit frictions when 
is conducted in a conventional way with only one instrument (i.e. short-term nominal interest 
rate). However, the central bank can control both the price and the amount of money when 
collateral is a bounded set of eligible assets. In this circumstance, the central bank can 
                                                          
2 The additional liquidity would be cancelled by the offsetting sterilization operations. 
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purchase secured loans at a more favourable price (higher than market price) in order to 
alleviate the severity of borrowing constraints, reduce the lending rate and stimulate the credit 
market. 
Altavilla et al. (2014) studied the macroeconomic effects of the Outright Monetary 
Transaction (OMT) programme announced during the period July-September 2012. The 
authors used high-frequency data, a multi-country model describing the macro financial 
linkages and focused on four countries: France, Germany, Italy and Spain. Regarding the 2-
year government bond yields, the OMT announcements decreased the Italian and Spanish 
yields by about 200 basis points, and left unchanged the bond yields of the same maturity in 
Germany and France. The reduction of the 10-year government bond yields in Italy and Spain 
(about 100 basis points) were smaller than the decrease in 2-year bond yields, which is 
consistent with the target of this monetary policy measure, i.e. explicit focus on bonds with 
remaining maturities of up to 3 years. Regarding the macroeconomic effects, the decrease in 
bond yields due to the OMT announcements was associated with a substantial effect on credit, 
economic growth and prices in Italy and Spain, but relatively limited spillovers in France and 
Germany. 
Ferrando et al. (2015) studied the effects on the small firms’ financing of sovereign 
stress and of the unconventional euro area monetary policy during the period of the debt crisis 
(2009Q1-2014Q1). It is import to stress that small firms are more likely to be credit 
constrained when banks adjust portfolios due to negative shocks on balance sheets. The 
authors concluded that small firms in the stressed countries were more likely credit rationed 
through both the price and quantity, as well as increased debt securities.3 However, there was 
evidence that the OMT decreased the share of credit-rationed firms.4 Therefore, firms with 
improved outlook were more likely to benefit from easier credit conditions. Even in the 
stressed countries, the first semester after the announcement of the OMT programme had a 
positive impact credit access. In addition, firms were more likely to reduce 
government‑subsidized loans. 
Garcia-de-Andoain et al. (2016) studied the effect of the liquidity provision by the ECB 
on the overnight unsecured interbank markets. The authors used data from the payment 
system TARGET2 for the period 2008-2014 and a structural vector auto-regression. They 
report evidence that the ECB had acted as lender-of-last-resort for the banking system, in 
                                                          
3 This study considered as “stressed countries” Greece, Ireland, Italy Portugal and Spain.  
4 The OMT Program was announced on 2nd August 2012 and technical framework on 6th September 2012. For 
more detail, see the section on Non-conventional instruments of monetary policy. 
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spite of no explicit reference to this function on the ECB’s mandate. In addition, there were 
two effects of central bank liquidity: the replacement of the demand for liquidity in the 
interbank market (financial crisis 2008-2010), and an increase in the supply of liquidity in the 
interbank market in Greece, Italy and Spain (the debt crisis 2011-2013). 
Andrade et al. (2016) analysed the effects of the expanded asset purchase programme 
(APP) on the macro economy, sovereign yields and transmission channels. The APP was 
announced in January 2015 and it decreased sovereign yields on long-term bonds, as well as 
increased the share prices of banks, in particular banks with higher weight of sovereign bonds 
in portfolios. The results are consistent with the portfolio rebalancing channel due to the 
removal of duration risk as well as the relaxation of leverage constraints for financial 
intermediaries. The macroeconomic impact of the APP may be sizable due to ease credit 
conditions and reanchoring inflation expectations towards its medium-term inflation 
objective. 
Additionally, Afonso and Jalles (2017) report that in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 
economic and financial crisis the quantitative easing measures implemented by the ECB 
became  relevant determinants of the yield spreads. In fact, using a time-varying analysis, the 
Covered Bond Purchase Programme contributed to reduce yield spreads in all euro area 
countries, particularly in the crisis period, 2011-2013, while longer-term refinancing 
operations contributed to reduce yield spreads in most countries. 
 
3. Methodological framework 
According to the TFUE, the sole responsibility for the ECB is the price stability over 
the medium term. However, the most appropriate monetary policy for the euro area as a 
whole may not be the most appropriate for each country. Price stability is defined as inflation 
rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. Figure 1 compares the inflation rate in 
the euro area and Portugal. The average inflation in Portugal (2.09%) was higher than in the 
euro area (1.70%) in the period 1997-2016.   
[Figure 1] 
 
Some previous literature assessed monetary policy through the simple Taylor rule. 
However, the period 1999-2016 includes both normal times and the zero lower bound. 
Consequently, some papers used modified Taylor rules (e.g. non-linear Taylor rule) in order 
to assess monetary policy in a context of the zero lower bound. Nevertheless, 
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Bernanke (2015) warned about the complexity of the underlying judgements to make 
decisions and that such simple rule does not provide guidance when the predicted rate is 
negative. In this way, monetary policy decisions are more complex than a simple Taylor rule 
and monetary policy should be systematic.  
 
3.1 Non-conventional instruments of monetary policy 
We can split the ECB’s monetary policy into two periods, where the introduction of 
non-conventional instruments in July 2009 was the determinant factor. It is important to stress 
the difference between the periods before and after the economic and financial crisis in 
2007-2009. 
The period between the introduction of the euro and the financial crisis was characterized 
by a reduction of government bond yields in euro area countries as well as narrower yield 
spreads among countries, higher economic growth, easier external financing and increasing 
external imbalances. There were only conventional instruments of monetary policy. 
Afterwards, the economic and financial crisis influenced the core countries of the euro 
area, in particular via a direct impact on bank balance sheets. In the aftermath of the crisis, 
there was evidence of fragmentation (i.e. decrease of financial integration) on the European 
financial markets, which generated the sudden stop in the capital inflows to the European 
external deficit countries. 
The financial crisis was the main factor for the introduction of non-conventional 
instruments by the ECB, and each of the instruments had a specific aim. Table 1 presents the 
non-conventional instruments, the announcement date and the period of implementation and 
their main features. The non-conventional instruments included the following programmes 
instruments for the period 2009-2016 (Table 1 and Figure 2). 
Covered bond purchase programme (CBPP1) - the aim of supporting a specific financial 
market segment that was important for the funding of banks and that was particularly affected 
by the financial crisis. The nominal amount (EUR 60 billion) has been purchased on the 
primary and secondary markets. The Eurosystem intends to keep the purchased covered bonds 
until maturity. 
[Table 1] [Figure 2] 
The Securities Markets Programme (SMP) aimed at ensuring liquidity and depth in 
malfunctioning segments of the debt securities markets as well as restoring an appropriate 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. In the beginning, there was no central bank 
liquidity change because the purchases of debt securities were sterilised. In addition, the SMP 
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did not alter the stance of monetary policy. This programme purchased sovereign debt on the 
secondary market (of Ireland, Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal), with the ECB holding 
sovereign debt to maturity and suspending sterilisation in June 2014. 
The Covered bond purchase programme 2 (CBPP2) aimed to ease funding conditions 
for credit institutions and enterprises as well as to encourage credit institutions to maintain 
and expand lending. This programme included purchases on the primary and secondary 
markets. The Eurosystem intends to keep these bonds until maturity. 
The OMT aimed at safeguarding an appropriate monetary policy transmission and the 
singleness of the monetary policy as well as replacing the SMP. It will be considered for 
countries with macroeconomic adjustment programmes or precautionary programmes. There 
is a strict conditionality attached to a European Financial Stability Facility/European Stability 
Mechanism (EFSF/ESM) programme. The focus is on the sovereign bonds with a maturity of 
between one and three years and the transactions are fully sterilized.  
The targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) operations aimed at 
providing financing to credit institutions for periods of up to four years. Therefore, they allow 
offering long-term funding at attractive conditions to banks in order to ease private sector 
credit conditions and stimulate bank lending to the real economy. In this way, the TLTROs 
reinforce the transmission of monetary policy. There were two series of TLTROs: a first 
series announced on 5 June 2014 (TLTRO I) and a second series on 10 March 2016 
(TLTRO II). The amount that banks can borrow is linked to their loans to households 
(excluding loans to households for house purchase) and NFCs. 
In addition, the expanded APP was decided on 22 January 2015 and aimed at sustaining 
the adjustment of inflation path. It included the current programmes at that date and added 
another programme in March 2016.  
The third Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP3) had the aim of enhancing the 
transmission of monetary policy, facilitating credit provision to the euro area economy, 
generating positive spillovers to other markets and contributing to a return of inflation rates to 
the medium term target. The Eurosystem central banks purchase eligible bonds in the primary 
and secondary markets. 
The Asset-backed securities purchase programme (ABSPP)’s purpose was enhancing 
the transmission of monetary policy, facilitating credit provision to the euro area economy 
and generating positive spillovers to other markets. The ABSPP also helped banks to diversify 
funding sources and stimulated the issuance of new securities, by purchasing in both the 
primary and secondary ABS markets. 
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The Public sector purchase programme (PSPP) aims at fulfilling the price stability 
mandate and provide monetary stimulus in a context of the zero lower bound. The PSPP 
makes access to finance cheaper for households and firms in order to support consumption 
and investment. Therefore, the improvement of economic activity contributes to a return of 
inflation rates towards the medium term target. There are only secondary market purchases.   
The Corporate sector purchase programme (CSPP) aims to further strengthen the pass-
through of the Eurosystem’s asset purchases to the financing conditions of the real economy. 
In addition, the CSPP provides further monetary policy accommodation and helps inflation 
rates return to the medium term target. The purchases will be conducted in the primary and 
secondary markets and non-bank corporations established in the euro area issue the euro-
denominated bonds. 
Figure 3 presents the total outstanding of the ECB’s purchases. The PSPP presents the 
largest outstanding and it has been increasing since the introduction in March 2015. The SMP 
presents the second largest outstanding, but it has been decreasing since the end of this 
programme in the summer 2012 due to the maturity of some government bonds (Figure 3 and 
Figure 4).  
[Figure 3] [Figure 4] 
 Furthermore, when a solvent financial institution faces temporary liquidity problems, 
it is possible to obtain a provision of credit by the Eurosystem national central bank: the 
Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA). This instrument is not a monetary policy instrument, 
but it increases the central bank money. Therefore, any costs arising from the provision of the 
ELA will be incurred by the national central bank. 
 
Sterilisation 
During the implementation of non-conventional instruments of monetary policy, it is 
important to identify two periods: full sterilization and non-sterilization. In the case of full 
sterilization, the ECB conducted specific operations with the aim of re-absorbing the liquidity 
injected through the purchases underlying non-standard instruments of monetary policy, 
avoiding the variation of the money supply.  
Table 2 presents the date of 5 June 2014 when the ECB suspended sterilisation of non-




Hence, the Taylor rule approach may not be useful to assess the impact of monetary 
policy on the Portuguese economy due to a large range of non-conventional instruments and 
zero lower bound. 
Finally, we can observe that the disaggregation of the ECB’s balance sheet changed 
during the period 1999-2015. Figure 5 includes the non-conventional instruments on the 
balance sheet:  lending to euro area credit institutions related to monetary policy operations 
denominated in euro and securities of euro area residents denominated in euro. The increase 
of these assets was offset by an increase of the banknotes in circulation and liabilities to euro 
area credit institutions related to monetary policy operations denominated in euro.   
[Figure 5] 
 
3.2 Disaggregation by institutional sector  
Zero lower bound 
Gaspar (2016) presented the role of monetary policy in two different contexts: in 
normal times, monetary policy is a shock absorber while in the zero lower bound monetary 
policy is a shock amplifier. In normal times, a negative demand shock pressures inflation 
downward and monetary policy cuts nominal interest rates with the aim of decreasing real 
interest rates and depreciating exchange rate. Therefore, it is expected that higher nominal 
GDP and monetary policy is a shock absorber. 
However, in the case of the zero lower bound, a negative demand shock pressures 
inflation downward, but the central bank cannot decrease nominal interest rates because 
monetary policy is at the effective lower bound (i.e. nominal interest rates close to zero). 
Consequently, there are higher real interest rates and exchange rate appreciation, which 
impact negatively on nominal GDP and public and private debt ratios. In fact, there is a 
vicious cycle with stronger negative demand shock and decrease of inflation and nominal 
GDP. For that reason, monetary policy is a shock amplifier. Therefore, a coordinated policy, 
including monetary policy non-conventional instruments, fiscal policy (e.g. infrastructure 
investment) and structural reforms (labour and product market and tax system) is paramount.   
 
Demand, supply and monetary policy 
There is consensus that monetary policy has real effects on the economy at least in the 
short run. The transmission channels of monetary policy can influence aggregate demand. In 
addition, a prolonged and deep recession as well as a depressed demand has a negative impact 
on the trajectory of potential output. Delong and Summers (2012) studied the role of fiscal 
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policy in a depressed economy (the United States). In the case of short-term nominal interest 
rates at the zero lower bound, with high cyclical unemployment, large output gap and excess 
capacity, an increase in government expenditure would not be either offset by monetary 
policy or neutralized by supply-side bottlenecks.  
Therefore, it is important to stress the negative effect of depressed aggregate demand 
on the aggregate supply and potential output. In fact, even with a small amount of hysteresis, 
an expansionary fiscal policy may be self-financing. If it is not, expansionary fiscal policy 
may raise the present value of future potential output. In this way, the zero lower bound 
requires coordination between monetary and fiscal policy. 
 The ECB monetary policy decisions can affect the economy through several channels: 
the interest rate, the bank lending and the balance sheet, the exchange rate, the asset prices, 
the wealth effect, as well as the Tobin’s  ratio between the physical asset's market value and 
the replacement cost of capital. In addition, we can connect channels and institutional sectors: 
e.g. bank equity prices, portfolios flows, exchange rate, sovereign yield, wages and available 
income. According to economic theory, we elaborate on how monetary policy can impact on 
each institutional sector.  
 General government 
The ECB monetary policy has the sole responsibility of price stability, but some 
monetary policy decisions impact on sovereign yields. There have been non-conventional 
instruments that eased the pass through of monetary policy and reduced government bond 
yields (e.g. the SMP and OMT announcement). In fact, the ECB holds public debt under non-
conventional measures. Therefore, monetary policy decisions can impact on the yield curve 
and the rollover of public debt and the funding of the budget deficit may be affected.  
Other monetary financial institutions     
The monetary policy decisions can impact on the structure of banks’ balance sheets. 
For that reason, tighter (or easier) monetary policy can increase (decrease) interest rates along 
the yield curve and decrease (increase) the price of financial assets. 
On the assets side, it is important to decompose the amount of credit allocated to the 
mortgage credit, which is more related to non-transactional goods and services, and the 
amount allocated to the NFCs. Furthermore, the stock related to the non-performing 
loans (NPLs) can impact on decisions’ banks to accept new loans. Additionally, monetary 
policy can impact on the amount of public debt on the balance sheets of the other MFIs. 
On the liabilities side, monetary policy can change the yield curve, which may be 
important for the evolution in the composition between deposits, wholesale funding, equity 
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and bonds. In addition, loans to NFCs and households may be essential for investment (supply 
side) and private consumption, respectively. Furthermore, the criteria for eligible assets for 
monetary policy operations is defined by the ECB and impacts on the other MFIs’ decisions. 
Holdings of assets included in the set of eligible assets may be used as collateral for monetary 
policy operations.  
Households 
Monetary policy can impact on interest earnings and payments. The difference 
between earnings and payments depends on the stock of financial assets (deposits and bonds) 
and liabilities (loans), as well as the interest rate level. In addition, monetary policy can 
impact on the yield curve slope, new loans, NPLs and the amount of saving. The money 
market interest rates can impact on portfolio savings (e.g. deposits, bonds, bills, shares, public 
debt certificates). Therefore, it is interesting to assess how much monetary policy impacts on 
deposits (asset), loans (liability) and available income. 
Non-financial corporations 
Monetary policy impacts on the balance structure through the interest rate and price 
effects. The ratio between loans and equity is an indicator about the main source of funding.  
Additionally, economic growth and monetary policy stance may impact on NPLs. Investment 
is a key determinant for the stock of capital, which is an input to the production function 
(aggregate supply). Therefore, monetary policy can affect potential output through real 
investment.   
External balance 
A tighter (or easier) monetary policy can appreciate (or depreciate) both the nominal 
and real exchange rate in the short term.5 However, according to the interest rate parity a 
positive (negative) difference between nominal interest rates of two countries with different 
currencies is the result of depreciation (appreciation) of the nominal exchange rate in the 
country with higher (lower) nominal interest rates and higher (lower) inflation rate over the 
long term. Therefore, the euro area monetary policy can impact on exchange rate in the short 
and long term with the trading partners located outside the EMU.  
International investment position 
In addition, monetary policy can impact on the composition of the external balance, 
balance of payments, financial accounts and international investment position (IIP). A tighter 
(easier) monetary policy can impact on interest rates in monetary and financial markets. In 
                                                          
5 This result depends also on the monetary policy decisions of the other central banks.  
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this way, the wealth effect defines that higher (lower) interest rates along the yield curve 
mean lower (higher) asset prices, i.e. prices of bonds and shares. In addition, the IIP is 
presented on market value. The price effect may vary along time, which includes assets held 
by residents and liabilities held by non-residents. Additionally, the IIP is affected by the 
exchange rate.   
 
4. Empirical analysis 
Concerning the Portuguese economy, we have as sources the quarterly national accounts 
from Statistics Portugal (INE) as well as the financial accounts from the Portuguese central 
bank (Banco de Portugal). In addition, we collected a database for the total outstanding of 
conventional and non-conventional instruments of the ECB’s monetary policy.  
Our set of independent variables includes control variables as well as variables related 
to monetary policy: 3-month Euribor rate, slope of the yield curve (difference between 
12-month Euribor and 3-month Euribor rate), the interest rate on the main refinancing 
operations, the corridor between deposit and lending facilities interest rates, the amount of 
non-conventional instruments, monetary aggregates, exchange rate and the SMP period. 
The Portuguese economy has presented a deterioration in terms of the ratio between 
financial assets and financial liabilities. Specifically, households reported the strongest 
deterioration due to the decrease of the deposits-to-loans ratio. The change in the structure of 
stocks of financial accounts (i.e. liabilities and assets) of the institutional sectors is achieved 
through financial flows.  
 
4.1. Impact of the euro area monetary policy, by institutional sectors  
In this subsection we assess if monetary policy variables have an impact on the 
relevant variables of each institutional sector. We consider a large range of monetary 
variables: the key ECB interest rates, monetary market interest rates and the non-standard 
instruments. Consequently, the set of independent variables includes both monetary and non-
monetary variables, as well as external and domestic variables. We use the variables in 
differences in order to avoid non-stationary.  
 
4.1.1. General government 
Equation (2) decomposes the yield spread () between the Portuguese and the 
German 10-year sovereign yield. It takes into account the decomposition of the spread 
( ) between the Portuguese 10-year government yield and the average 
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10-year sovereign yield on a set of the peripheral countries (Italy/Ireland/Spain), as well as 
the spread () of this average vis-à-vis the 10-year Bund yield:   
  =  + . (2) 
It is important to stress that during the period 1996Q1-2009Q4 the yield spread between 
the Portuguese sovereign yield and the average of the other peripheral countries was around 
zero (average = 0 basis points, see Figure 6). Interestingly, Coronero (2016) presented a 
decomposition of the yield spread, identifying the shadow spread. In the context of a lower 
zero bound the German 10-year sovereign yield is constrained and the yield spread is 
compressed. However, different economic fundamentals (sovereign risk) between countries 
remain in spite of the lower zero bound. In this way, the shadow spread is the sovereign 
spread that would be observed in the absence of the lower bound. 
[Figure 6] 
 Additionally, we estimate the determinants of the share of long-term public debt-to-
total public debt in the Portuguese case. Equation (3) presents the q-o-q variation of the share 







) ∗ 100 = ,- + ,. /0 1 + ,23 0_/0 1 + 5 . (3) 
The Portuguese long term debt-to-total public debt ratio increased during the period 
after the financial crisis. In addition, the dependent variable decreased due to the German ratio 
of long term securities-to-total public debt, which may be a benchmark for the euro area, and 
the sovereign yield spread between the peripheral countries (Italy/Ireland/Spain) and 
Germany. When this spread was lower it was easier to roll over public debt, which decreased 
the weight of long term debt securities. 
[Table 3] 
On the other hand, financial integration in the euro area government bond had a 
negative impact on the dependent variable, which means that it was easier to roll over public 
debt during periods of increasing financial integration. During the SMP period, there was a 
reduction of the weight of long-term bonds due to increasing long-term sovereign yields. The 
sovereign yield spread between Portugal and Italy/Ireland/Spain had a negative statistically 
significant effect before the financial crisis, which may have been associated with country 
specific difficulties to issue long term sovereign bonds. During the EFAP, there was a 
reduction of long term debt due to funding from the EU/IMF loans. In addition, the exchange 




 4.1.2. Other monetary and financial institutions 
In this institutional sector, liabilities and assets had a different composition throughout 
the period of analysis (Figure 7). Funding from the non-resident financial institutions 
decreased after the financial crisis, but deposits and funding from the Portuguese central bank 
offset that difference. 
Concerning lending margins, loans to NFCs had higher profitability than loans for 
housing purposes. However, there was a strong increase of NPLs in particular related to NFCs 
(Figure 8). 
[Figure 7] [Figure 8] 
Demertzis and Wolff (2016) discussed the impact of the ECB’s quantitative easing on 
bank profitability. They mentioned three channels: weakening the exchange rate (exchange 
rate channel), decreasing the long-term interest rates, improving investment conditions and 
disincentivising savings (interest rate channel), and driving investors into riskier investments 
while the ECB purchases safe long-term assets (portfolio rebalancing channel). However, the 
authors stressed the effects of the two main channels: weaker exchange rate as well as lower 
sovereign bond yields. In fact, banks did not shed sovereign debt at a significant scale and 
bank profitability was squeezed by quantitative easing, while additional purchases of 
corporate bonds can reduce financial margins.   
Regarding the other MFIs, we estimate two important components from the liability 
side: liabilities vis-à-vis the Portuguese central bank and non-resident institutions. In equation 
(4) 67876797: 0_;<= ; is the q-o-q variation of the liabilities of the Portuguese other 
MFIs vis-à-vis non-residents. In this variable non-residents include other MFIs and non-
monetary financial institutions. The set of independent variables include both monetary and 
non-monetary variables: 
 
 67876797: 0_;<= ; =  μ- + μ.@ /0 1 + μ2A 0_/0 1 + B . (4) 
 
Table 4 presents the results for the determinants of external funding, i.e. liabilities of 
the resident other MFIs vis-à-vis non-residents. Regression 6 in Table 4 shows there was a 
reduction of external funding due to financial systemic stress in Europe.6 During the period 
after the financial crisis the dependent variable decreased, in particular a deeper reduction 
took place during the EFAP. However, external funding increased due to financial integration 
                                                          
6 The measure of financial stress in Europe is the CISS: composite indicator of systemic stress.  
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on government debt in the euro area, the slope of yield curve on the monetary market and the 
10-year government yield. In addition, there was statistical significance of the standing 
facilities corridor, 12- month Euribor rate after the financial crisis and financial integration of 
corporate bonds (regression 4). 
[Table 4] 
In equation (5)	67876797: 
C0 D;	E 	F
	is the y-o-y variation of the assets of 
Banco de Portugal vis-à-vis resident other MFIs (i.e. liabilities of the resident other MFIs vis-
à-vis the Portuguese central bank): 
 67876797: 
C0 D;	E 	F




 B . (5) 
 Funding from the Portuguese central bank includes the main refinancing operations 
and longer term refinancing operations. The dependent variable was positively explained by 
the systemic stress in Europe (Table 5). However, central bank funding was negatively 
explained by the current account variation, financial integration in the euro area sovereign 
bonds, 3-month Euribor rate and new deposits from households. These results are according 
to economic theory, i.e. when external funding was expensive or unavailable, the central bank 
offset funding to the Portuguese other MFIs. In addition, higher new deposits from 
households and higher current account balances reduced funding requirements for the 
Portuguese other MFIs. 
[Table 5] 
4.1.3. Households 
The loans-to-deposits ratio is essential to assess the households’ financial accounts. 
Regarding interests, earnings had been higher than payments, but in some periods that was 
only a small difference. Concerning liabilities, housing loans are the main component (Figure 
9), but there was a decrease in this item after the beginning of the EFAP. 
 [Figure 9] 
Equation (6) specifies the estimation for the y-o-y variation of new loans to 
households: 
 HI_6JH: 




 O . (6) 
 Regarding new loans to households (Table 6), there was a positive impact from 
financial integration in the euro area measured by either cross holdings of corporate bonds or 
cross holdings of government bonds (regression 6). In addition, there was a negative effect of 
the monetary aggregate M3 growth and during the EFAP period. In addition, the public debt-





4.1.4. Non-financial corporations 
In this institutional sector, we assess the decomposition of assets and liabilities. 
Concerning liabilities, the share of loans declined after 2008 (Figure 10).  
[Figure 10] 
 In equation (7), HI_6JH: <<< <; is the y-o-y growth of new loans to NFCs. 
 HI_6JH: <<< <; = P- + P.Q /0 1 + P2 0_/0 1 + R . (7) 
 The estimation results show that new loans to NFCs were positively affected by the 
period of the EFAP, Portuguese 10-year sovereign yield, PSI-20 index and financial 
integration in the euro area corporate bonds (Table 7). During the EFAP, there was the 
EU/IMF funding to the general government, which may have meant absence of crowding out 
effects on new loans to NFCs. On the other hand, in periods of financial stress in Europe, 
public debt was the safe haven and consequently there were reductions in sovereign yield and 
new loans to NFCs. An increase in the PSI-20 led to a rise of the market value on equity, i.e. 
it suggested easier access to new loans and higher expected future profits. Increases of NPLs 
during the previous quarter had a positive impact on the new loans, which may have been a 
signal of recovery in the credit market for the following periods. Financial integration 
measured by cross holdings of corporate bonds increased the dependent variable, which was a 
proxy of financial integration for the private sector. The increase of total NPLs in the previous 
quarter suggested a rise in the new loans to NFCs, which may be explained by the fact that 
loans to this institutional sector were more profitable than loans to households.    
[Table 7] 
However, there was a decrease of the dependent variable due to the Euribor, which 
was a basis for interest rates on new loans. Furthermore, higher systemic stress in Europe was 
a proxy for the constraints on the Portuguese other MFIs to borrow external funding and 
consequently providing fewer new loans to NFCs.  
 
4.2. Impact of the euro area monetary policy on external accounts 
4.2.1. External balance and terms of trade 
The terms of trade compare the path between export prices and import prices. The 
increase of the money supply in the euro area impacts the nominal and real exchange rate in 
the short term. However, the depreciation of exchange rate leads to higher prices of imports 
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and lower prices of exports. There is an effect on the trade balance through two opposite 
effects: the increase of real exports and decrease of real imports, as well as the deterioration in 
the terms of trade with a negative impact on the trade balance. Figure 11 shows the difference 
between the trade balance (which is a nominal variable) and “trade balance” with exports and 
imports in volume.7 There was a rebalancing during the EFAP and a positive effect of the 
terms of trade.  
[Figure 11] 
In equation (8), the dependent variable is the q-o-q variation of the terms of trade. 
 9_9S: 0 D = T- + T. /0 1 + T2U 0_/0 1 + R . (8) 
Our results (regression 6) show the negative effect of the lagged 3-month Euribor rate 
and oil prices (Table 8). Therefore, an increase of commodities may have been an upward 
pressure on inflation and the ECB increased the interest rates in order to subdue inflation. 
Consequently, there was an increase of the 3-month Euribor rate, as well as a negative impact 
on the terms of trade. In addition, the coefficients of Brent prices were negative, which mean 
that there was not a complete pass through from the oil prices spike to the exports deflator. 
Therefore, an increase in the oil prices had a stronger impact on the imports deflator than on 
the exports deflator. The impact of the oil prices in the previous quarter was stronger than the 
current quarter. The systemic stress in Europe had a positive effect in the terms of trade.  In 
fact, there was a negative correlation between the q-o-q change in the oil prices and the q-o-q 
change of the CISS. In addition, the pass through from imports deflator to the exports deflator 
was not complete. In this way, higher CISS was correlated to lower imports deflator, which 
was beneficial to the trade of terms. Finally, the exchange rate, unit labour costs, 
compensation of employees and labour productivity had no statistical significance. In this 
way, the terms of trade were mostly determined by oil prices recorded in the previous quarter. 
[Table 8] 
 
4.2.2. International investment position: price variation  
The IIP variation is decomposed into flows, exchange rate effect, price effect and 
other adjustments. We focus on the price effect, which may be impacted by the ECB 
monetary policy stance. The price effect is determined by changes in the market value on 
assets and liabilities. In this way, monetary policy can impact on securities prices and 
consequently on the IIP.  There was a sizeable price effect in some quarters (Figure 12). 
                                                          
7 The trade balance is a nominal indicator (nominal exports – nominal imports). However, we present the balance 




 In equation (9) the dependent variable is the price effect of the IIP variation as a 
percentage of GDP.   
 VVW 
C<E_XXE = Y- + Y.Z /0 1 + Y2[ 0_/0 1 + R . (9) 
 
We estimate the determinants that impact on the price effect underlying to the assets 
and liabilities for the period 2000-2015, and our results are according to the economic theory. 
There was evidence of a positive impact in the period after the financial crisis, for 10-year 
sovereign yield and S&P 500 index (Table 9). However, there was a negative impact from the 
Portuguese stock market (PSI-20) and during the SMP period. On the assets side, there was a 
positive effect price due to foreign assets held by the residents in Portugal (S&P 500 is a 
proxy for international stock markets). Regarding the liabilities side, increases of the 
Portuguese sovereign yield decreased government bond prices and consequently the market 
value of the Portuguese government debt held by foreigners. In addition, the variation of the 
PSI-20 index is a proxy for the equity securities held by foreigners. During the EFAP there 
was a reduction of the Portuguese sovereign yield and a negative impact on effect price. 
[Table 9] 
 
5. Robustness analysis 
In this section we decompose notably the set of external and domestic independent 
variables. External variables are the following: 10-year Bund yield, Euribor rates, dummy for 
the period after the financial crisis in 2009, financial integration/fragmentation in the euro 
area measured by government and corporate bonds, financial systemic stress in Europe, long 
term German public debt ratio, monetary aggregate M3. The remaining independent variables 
are domestic: general government debt-to-GDP ratio, the EFAP period, PSI-20 index, current 
account, NPLs and EU/IMF funding. 
In the case of external independent variables there was no potential endogeneity. The 
weight of the Portuguese economy in the euro area is small. Consequently, economic 
developments in Portugal were unable to determine the path for the economic indicators of 
the euro area.  
Regarding the domestic variables included in estimations, there was no endogeneity 
between the regressors and the dependent variable. Notwithstanding, we estimate regressions 
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through maximum likelihood and generalized method of moments (GMM). We consider 
regressions with a previous higher statistical significance.  
 The maximum likelihood estimator takes the assumption that the contemporaneous 
errors present a joint normal distribution. The GMM estimator takes the assumption that the 
disturbances in the equations are uncorrelated with instrumental variables. The instruments 
are the regressors (in the case of the external variables) and lagged regressors (domestic 
variables). The OLS estimator takes the assumption that the independent variables are 
uncorrelated with the residual. Therefore, OLS is a particular case of GMM.  
The robustness analysis has similar conclusions in spite of different estimators.8 The 
coefficients estimated by GMM and OLS are very analogous when we compare their 
magnitude and statistical significance. In addition, the GMM coefficients present higher 
statistical significance than coefficients estimated by maximum likelihood. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have studied the impact of the euro area monetary policy on the 
Portuguese economy during the period 2000-2015. We considered a decomposition of each of 
the institutional sectors:  general government, households, other MFIs, NFCs and external 
sector. All institutional sectors were affected by monetary policy, financial integration in the 
euro area as well as by the EFAP. 
We estimate the effects of monetary policy on the dependent variables, which are 
proxies for the funding for each institutional sector: long term public debt ratio, funding from 
the Portuguese central bank to the other MFIs, external funding, and new loans to households 
and NFCs. In addition, we estimate the terms of trade and the price effect underlying to the 
IIP. The estimations include both monetary and non-monetary independent variables. 
Regarding the general government, the ratio of long term-to-total public debt was 
positively explained by the German long debt-to-total public debt ratio, sovereign yield 
spread between Italy/Ireland/Spain and Germany, and the period after the financial crisis. 
However, there was a negative effect from the sovereign yield spread between Portugal and 
Italy/Ireland/Spain after the financial crisis, financial integration in the euro area related to 
government bonds, and during the SMP and EFAP periods. 
In the case of the other MFIs, external funding was positively determined by the slope 
of the yield curve and financial integration in the euro area related to government bonds. 
However, there was a negative effect due to systemic stress in Europe, and during the period 
                                                          
8 We do not report the results due to space constraints, but they are available on request. 
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after the financial crisis and during the EFAP. Additionally, funding from the Portuguese 
central bank decreased due to financial integration in the euro area government bonds, current 
account-to-GDP, 3-month Euribor rate and new deposits from households. On the other hand, 
there was an increase due to financial stress in Europe.  
Concerning households, new loans were positively determined by financial integration 
in the euro area: cross holdings of both corporate and government bonds. On the other side, 
there was a negative effect due to Euribor rate, public debt-to-GDP ratio, monetary 
aggregate M3, NPLs and the EFAP period.  
In relation to NFCs, new loans recovered during the EFAP period and were positively 
explained by the lagged Portuguese 10-year sovereign yield, PSI-20 index, NPLs and cross 
holdings of corporate bonds. On the other side, systemic stress in Europe and the 3-month 
Euribor rate had a negative impact. 
The terms of trade were negatively explained by lagged oil prices in USD and Euribor 
rate. Nevertheless, systemic stress in Europe impacted positively. 
The price effect underlying to the IIP was positively impacted by the period after the 
financial crisis, Portuguese 10-year sovereign yield and S&P 500. Still, there was a negative 
impact due to the PSI-20 and the EFAP period. 
Interestingly, financial integration can be measured by cross holdings of government 
bonds or corporate bonds. However, the impact of financial integration on each institutional 
sector was different between the two indicators. In addition, cross holdings of government 
bonds impacted negatively on long term-to-total public debt ratio as well as funding from the 
Portuguese central bank. Both cross holdings of government and corporate bonds impacted 
positively on new loans to households and external funding. On the other side, new loans to 
NFCs were positively determined by cross holdings of the euro area corporate bonds, while 
financial integration related to government bonds had no impact. 
The EFAP impacted on all institutional sectors. During this period there was a 
reduction of long term-to-GDP ratio, external funding to the Portuguese other MFIs, new 
loans to households and the effect price underlying to the IIP. Nevertheless, there was an 
increase of new loans to NFCs. 
In conclusion, monetary variables impact on the following variables: long term public 
debt ratio (impact due to the SMP), funding from the Portuguese central bank (Euribor), 
external funding (Euribor, standing facilities corridor and yield curve slope), new loans to 
households (REFI, Euribor and monetary aggregate M3), new loans to NFCs (Euribor and 
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Table 1 – Instruments of monetary policy, euro area 






Main refinancing operations Yes - 
Longer-term refinancing operations (LTRO) Yes - 
Targeted longer-term refinancing operations I 
(TLTRO I) 
No 
5 June 2014 
June 2014 – May 2016 
Targeted longer-term refinancing 
operations II (TLTRO II) 
No 
10 March 2016 




Covered bond purchase programme (CBPP1) No 
7 May 2009 
July 2009 – June 2010 
Securities Markets Programme (SMP) No 
10 May 2010   
May 2010 - September 2012 
Covered bond purchase programme (CBPP2) No 
6 October 2011 
Nov.2011 – Oct. 2012 
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) No 
2 August 2012 
- 
Covered bond purchase programme (CBPP3) No 
4 September 2014 
Since October 2014 
Asset-backed securities purchase programme 
(ABSPP) 
No 
4 September 2014 
Since November 2014 
Public sector purchase programme (PSPP) No 
22 January 2015 
Since March 2015 
Corporate sector purchase programme 
(CSPP) 
No 
10 March 2016 








Before 05 June 2014 After 05 June 2014
Full sterilization SMP, OMT OMT
Non-sterilization CBPP1, CBPP2 SMP, APP
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Notes: t-statistics in brackets.  *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. Heteroskedasticity and 




Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
constant -0.48* -0.76** -0.76** -0.8** -0.79** -0.79**
(-1.9) (-2.6) (-2.6) (-2.4) (-2.5) (-2.5)
Dummy EFAP -1.06** -1.53** -1.13* -1.15* -1.11* -1.13*
(-2.6) (-2.6) (-1.9) (-2) (-1.9) (-1.9)
Dummy financial crisis 1.11* 1.22** 1.28** 1.33** 1.45**
(1.9) (2.3) (2.3) (2.4) (2.6)
Δ yield spread PT vs GE (t-1) -0.004
(-1)
Δ yield spread IT/IR/SP vs GE (t-1) 1.6* 1.59* 1.63** 1.76**
(1.9) (1.9) (2.1) (2.2)
Δ yield spread PT vs IT/IR/SP (t-1) -0.01** -0.002 -0.002
(-2.3) (-0.5) (-0.5)
Δ yield spread PT vs IT/IR/SP (t-1) * (1-dummy financial crisis) -0.16*** -0.17***
(-2.9) (-3)
Δ German long debt ratio (t-2) 1.15** 1.15** 1.13*** 1.16** 1.18*** 1.18***
(2.5) (2.6) (2.7) (2.7) (3) (3)
Δ cross holdings of government bonds (t-1) -0.35 -0.54* -0.48* -0.46* -0.54** -0.53**
(-1.6) (-2) (-1.8) (-1.8) (-2.2) (-2.1)
Dummy SMP -1.11 -2.09** -2.07** -2.41*** -2.55***
(-1.2) (-2.4) (-2.4) (-4.2) (-4.6)
qoq EUR/USD 0.03
(0.6)
Δ Euribor 3 months 0.44
(1.2)
R-square 0.35 0.39 0.43 0.44 0.48 0.48
Durbin-Watson 2.08 2.11 2.08 2.08 1.91 1.95
Observations 61 61 61 61 61 61
Period 2000:4-2015:4 2000:4-2015:4 2000:4-2015:4 2000:4-2015:4 2000:4-2015:4 2000:4-2015:4
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Table 4 – Estimations of the q-o-q quarterly change of the liabilities of resident other MFIs vis-à-vis non-
residents (other MFIs and non-monetary financial institutions) 
(percentage points)  
 
Notes: t-statistics in brackets.  *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. Heteroskedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance (HAC) or Newey-West estimator. Equations were estimated by OLS. 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
constant 2.38** 2.41*** 2.11** 2.18*** 1.49* 1.49*
(2.6) (2.7) (2.6) (2.8) (2) (1.9)
Δ Euribor 12 months (t-1) 0.22 0.45 2.54 2.81
(0.1) (0.3) (1.1) (1.3)
Δ Euribor 12 months (t-1) * Dummy financial crisis -3.92* -4.18*
(-1.7) (-1.9)
Dummy financial crisis -4.88*** -4.52*** -4.5*** -5.32*** -5.8*** -5.7***
(-3.3) (-3.2) (-3.2) (-4.2) (-3.9) (-3.7)
Δ CISS -13.89** -13.5** -12.75** -10.16** -13.41** -15.71***
(-2.4) (-2.2) (-2) (-2) (-2.3) (-3.1)
Dummy EFAP -2.63* -2.48 -2.23 -3.18** -3.13**
(-1.8) (-1.6) (-1.4) (-2.1) (-2.2)
Dummy SMP 1.55
(0.9)
Δ cross holdings of corporate bonds (t-1) 1.72* 1.53* 2** 1.99** 1.49 1.69
(1.8) (1.7) (2.1) (2.3) (1.6) (1.7)
Δ cross holdings of government bonds (t-1) 1.43** 1.14** 1.33** 1.52*** 1.68*** 1.96***
(2.2) (2.1) (2.6) (3.1) (3.3) (3.6)
Δ ECB standing facilities corridor 5.7**
(2.2)
Δ (Euribor 12 months - Euribor 3 months) (t-2) 6.01** 5.99**
(2.1) (2.2)
Δ Portuguese sovereign yield 10 years (t-1) 0.82*
(1.9)
R-square 0.46 0.46 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.50
Durbin-Watson 2.11 2.09 2.14 2.16 2.23 2.22
Observations 64 64 64 64 64 64
Period 2000:1-2015:4 2000:1-2015:4 2000:1-2015:4 2000:1-2015:4 2000:1-2015:4 2000:1-2015:4
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Table 5 – Estimations of the y-o-y quarterly change of the assets of Banco de Portugal vis-à-vis resident 
other MFIs 
(percentage points)  
 
Notes: t-statistics in brackets.  *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. Heteroskedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance (HAC) or Newey-West estimator. Equations were estimated by OLS. 
 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
constant 91.78*** 79.44** 95.31*** 88.99*** 90.31*** 78.8***
(3.8) (2.5) (3.6) (4) (4) (2.9)
Δ
4
 current account as % of GDP -55.57*** -57.55*** -53.68*** -57.26*** -51.79*** -61.77***
(-4.5) (-4.1) (-3.7) (-4.7) (-4.2) (-4.3)
Δ
4
 CISS 358.18* 377.34** 353.46* 307.06* 236.67 401.7***
(2) (2) (1.8) (1.9) (1.6) (2.3)
yoy employment -39.36*** -37.47*** -41.07*** -21.89 -22.07 
(-3.1) (-3.4) (-3.7) (-1.5) (-1.2)
Δ
4
 cross holdings of government bonds -32.81** -32.72** -33.04*** -45.52*** -53.38*** -56.42***
(-2.1) (-2.2) (-2.1) (-2.9) (-3.9) (-3.5)
Dummy financial crisis 32.78
(0.7)




 Euribor 3 months -42.44*** -58.99*** -37.88*
(-2.8) (-3.8) (-2)
yoy households new deposits -2.13**
(-2)
R-square 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.51 0.49 0.53
Durbin-Watson 1.71 1.73 1.70 1.84 1.71 1.87
Observations 64 64 64 64 64 48
Period 2000:1-2015:4 2000:1-2015:4 2000:1-2015:4 2000:1-2015:4 2000:1-2015:4 2004:1-2015:4
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Table 6 – Estimations of the y-o-y quarterly change of new loans to households 
(percentage points) 
 
Notes: t-statistics in brackets.  *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. Heteroskedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance (HAC) or Newey-West estimator. Equations were estimated by OLS. 
 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
constant 28.39*** 31.93*** 30.8*** 31.96*** 34.86*** 32.5***

















 General government debt -1.57** -2.44*** -2.4*** -2.12* -2.12*** -1.74***
(-2.5) (-5.6) (-4.4) (-4) (-4.1) (-3.4)
yoy  monetary aggregate M3 -2.28*** -2.54*** -2.38** -2.52* -3.39*** -3.31***
(-3.3) (-3.2) (-2.5) (-3) (-3.7) (-3.6)




 Non-performing loans-to-GDP -0.65*** -0.69*** -0.73*** -0.73** -0.63*** -0.37 
(-2.9) (-3.5) (-3.5) (-3.4) (-3.2) (-1.4)
Δ
4




 cross holdings of government bonds 2.5**
(2.3)
R-square 0.73 0.70 0.68 0.71 0.73 0.76
Durbin-Watson 1.71 1.73 1.58 1.74 1.90 1.85
Observations 48 48 48 48 48 48
Period 2004:1-2015:4 2004:1-2015:4 2004:1-2015:4 2004:1-2015:4 2004:1-2015:4 2004:1-2015:4
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Table 7 – Estimations of the y-o-y quarterly change new loans to NFCs 
(percentage points) 
 
Notes: t-statistics in brackets.  *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. Heteroskedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance (HAC) or Newey-West estimator. Equations were estimated by OLS. 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
constant -9.72* -11.59** -6.62*** -7.52*** -10.28*** -10.14***
(-2) (-2.5) (-3.1) (-4.5) (-4.9) (-4.6)
Dummy financial crisis 0.74 3.58
(0.1) (0.5)
Dummy EFAP 10.58** 8.27** 11.86*** 10.59***
(2.5) (2.4) (2.8) (3.5)
Δ
4
 Euribor 3 months -4.03* -5.25** -7.62*** -7.73*** -6.68*** -6.35***
(-1.7) (-2.1) (-3.1) (-2.8) (-3.2) (-2.9)
Δ
4
 Portuguese sovereign yield 10 years (t-1) 1.05 1.5* 2.75*** 10*** 3.8*** 3.21***
(1.2) (1.8) (4.3) (3.6) (5.2) (7)
Δ
4
 Portuguese sovereign yield 10 years (t-1) * (dummy financial crisis) -7.55***
(-2.7)
yoy PSI-20 0.29*** 0.25** 0.21*** 0.2*** 0.2*** 0.21***
(5.2) (2.5) (5.1) (5.1) (4) (4.8)
Δ
4
 cross holdings of corporate bonds (t-1) 7.24*** 8.67*** 7.63*** 7.48*** 10.34*** 9.34***
(3.3) (4.3) (5.4) (5.3) (6) (7.1)
Δ
4




 CISS (t-3) -36.61*** -38.74** -44.23*** -43.9***
(-4.5) (-4.7) (-8.3) (-7.5)
Δ
4
 Non-performing loans-to-GDP (t-1) 9.9*** 8.55***
(6.4) (4.7)
Dummy SMP 13.84** 12.75**
(2.6) (2.2)




 General government debt-to-GDP -0.16 
(-0.5)
R-square 0.61 0.62 0.68 0.70 0.73 0.73
Durbin-Watson 1.89 1.91 2.03 2.11 2.26 2.13
Observations 49 49 49 49 49 49
Period 2004:1-2016:1 2004:1-2016:1 2004:1-2016:1 2004:1-2016:1 2004:1-2016:1 2004:1-2016:1
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Table 8 – Estimations of the q-o-q quarterly change of the terms of trade 
(percentage points) 
 
Notes: t-statistics in brackets.  *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. Heteroskedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance (HAC) or Newey-West estimator. Equations were estimated by OLS. 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
constant 0.13 0.27** 0.15 0.16* 0.12 0.18*
(1.3) (2.6) (1.5) (1.7) (1.2) (1.8)
Δ Euribor 3 months * EFAP -1.74*
(-2)
Δ Euribor 3 months (t-1) * EFAP 4.14**
(2.3)
Δ Euribor 3 months (t-2) * EFAP -3.24*** -1.41** -0.68** -0.64**
(-2.8) (-2.6) (-2.5) (-2.4)
Δ Euribor 3 months (t-2) 0.04 -0.63**
(0.1) (-2.2)
qoq Brent USD -0.01 -0.02** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01*
(-1.6) (-2.1) (-1.6) (-1.4) (-1.4) (-1.7)
qoq Brent USD (t-1) -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04***
(-6) (-5.4) (-6.8) (-6.5) (-6.3) (-5.5)
qoq Brent USD (t-2) -0.01 -0.01* -0.01 -0.01* -0.01** -0.02**
(-1.6) (-1.8) (-1.7) (-1.7) (-2.1) (-2.3)
Quarter 3 0.45 0.42* 0.34 0.40 0.34
(1.4) (1.7) (1.1) (1.3) (1.1)
Δ CISS 3.56* 3.14 4.29** 4.16** 4.18**
(1.9) (1.5) (2.5) (2.4) (2.3)
Δ REFI (t-2) -0.87 
(-1.4)
qoq nominal unit labour costs (t-1) 0.00
(-0.4)
qoq compensation employees (t-1) -0.01 
(-0.5)




R-square 0.5 0.42 0.46 0.49 0.50 0.50
Durbin-Watson 2.16 2.18 2.04 2.22 2.14 2.21
Observations 64 64 64 64 64 64
Period 2000:1-2015:4 2000:1-2015:4 2000:1-2015:4 2000:1-2015:4 2000:1-2015:4 2000:1-2015:4
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Table 9 – Estimations of the quarterly net international investment position: price effect 
(percentage of GDP) 
 
Notes: t-statistics in brackets.  *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. Heteroskedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance (HAC) or Newey-West estimator. Equations were estimated by OLS. 
 
  
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
constant 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01
(0) (-0.1) (-0.2) (0.1) (0.2) (0.1)
Dummy EFAP -1.43*** -1.43*** -1.48*** -1.45*** -1.4***
(-4.1) (-4) (-4) (-3.8) (-3.8)
Dummy financial crisis 0.75** 0.74** 1.05*** 0.52** 0.62**
(2.5) (2.5) (3.6) (2) (2.3)
Δ Portuguese sovereign yield 10 years 1*** 0.98*** 1.03*** 0.95*** 1.12*** 1.11***
(4.5) (4.2) (5.2) (4.6) (7) (4.9)




qoq PSI-20 -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.09*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12***
(-8.6) (-8.3) (-6.6) (-8.4) (-6.8) (-8.3)
qoq S&P 500 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.07***
(2.9) (2.9) (3) (3)
Δ cross holdings of government bonds -0.07 
(-0.3)
Δ (Euribor 12 months - Euribor 3 months) -1.20 
(-1.3)
R-square 0.73 0.73 0.69 0.73 0.66 0.73
Durbin-Watson 2.15 2.14 2.20 2.03 1.79 2.09
Observations 64 64 64 64 64 64
Period 2000:1-2015:4 2000:1-2015:4 2000:1-2015:4 2000:1-2015:4 2000:1-2015:4 2000:1-2015:4
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Figure 1 – Inflation: Portugal, euro area and difference (PT-euro) 
(Quarter, y-o-y, percentage and percentage points) 
 
Source: Eurostat and own calculations. 
 
Figure 2 – Timetable of the unconventional instruments of the ECB monetary policy 
 






















































































































































































Figure 5 – Balance sheet of the ECB: main assets 





Figure 6 – Decomposition of the 10-year yield spread: Portugal, Germany and other peripheral 
countries (Italy, Spain and Ireland) 
(basis points) 
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Figure 7 – Portugal: other MFIs - liabilities  
(Millions euros)  
 
Source: Banco de Portugal and own calculations. 
  
Figure 8 – Portugal: non-performing loans (NPLs)  
(percentage of GDP)  
 





































































































Portuguese central bank Deposits vis-à-vis non-residents
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Figure 9 – Households – structure of credit 
(outstanding, percentage of GDP)  
 
Source: Banco de Portugal, Statistics Portugal and own calculations. 
 
 
Figure 10 – Financial liabilities of the NFCs: loans and equity  
(percentage of total financial liabilities (left), ratio (right))  
 









































































































































































































































Figure 11 – Portugal - external balance: nominal and volume  
(percentage of nominal GDP and real GDP)  
 
Source: Statistics Portugal and own calculations. 
 
Figure 12 – Portugal: international investment position – price effect  
(percentage of GDP)  
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